Populism, Liberalization and Popular Participation: Industrial Democracy in Egypt by Bayat, A.
Populism, Liberalization and Popular
Participation: Industrial Democracy in Egypt
Assef Bayat
The American University, Cairo
While the mobilizing character of the populist movements and regimes
in the Third World countries offers a great potential for the practice of
grassroots democracy, the populist ideology and development
strategy, at the same time, set certain serious constraints against
genuine democratic practices This theory is illustrated by a historical
analysis of the experience of industrial democracy in Egypt under
President Nasser and the subsequent regimes. Industrial democracy
was designed to serve as a part of the populist strategy of mobilizing
the working class in the post-revolutionary Egypt.
Introduction
The postwar period in the Third World has witnessed the emergence
of'radical' nationalist movements and regimes that while challenging
Western colonialism have also been weary of Soviet-type com-
munism. Such governments have enjoyed widespread popular sup-
port at home, and have manifested into a range of regimes from
Peronist Argentina, Vargas's Brazil, Nasser's Egypt, Nyerere's
Tanzania, Peru under General Velasco and the Islamic regime in
Iran. This paper aims to discuss the structural constraints such
populist regimes in the Third World countries face in sustaining
democratic and grassroots organizations despite the fact that they set
a ground for them.
By populist, we mean those Third World regimes which, by
combining nationalistic ideology and development strategy hold the
support of the 'popular masses' (including workers, peasants, the
'poor' and the petit bourgeoisie) as their social basis. Economically,
these regimes pursue state capitalism (with emphasis on profitability
and accumulation) within the framework of an authoritarian state
form. In line with their nationalistic and 'anti-imperialist' ideology,
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these regimes are consolidated primarily by the national mobilization
of the popular classes, or the 'people'. To this end, the 'people' are
encouraged to mobilize and organize in various forms at national and
local levels, in the workplaces, the state institutions, communities,
neighbourhoods and corporatist associations. This mobilization
offers a great potential for the creation or even extension of civil
society, and the practice of grassroots democracy, as it sets a potential
mechanism by which the people themselves can be involved directly in
the process of decision-making in their concerned areas or associ-
ations. However, as this paper will argue, while this potential for
empowering the grassroots remains a fact, populist regimes fail to
provide the conditions for long-term actualization of grassroots
democracy. In other words, whereas populism creates the possibility
of mass mobilization and popular organizations, its ideology and
development strategy come into conflict with genuine democratic
practices. The populist projects and regimes, therefore, remain short-
lived and lack continuity. The regimes tend to transform eventually
into ones which lean on the propertied ruling classes and groups
(instead of popular classes), functioning with a seemingly, if not
genuinely, open political system (instead of a strictly one-party or no-
party state), an open door economic policy (instead of one under state
control) and close ties to the West (instead of being nationalist).
The above theoretical considerations are illustrated below by an
historical analysis of the experience of popular participation in Egypt
under President Nasser and the subsequent regimes. More specific-
ally, I will base my argument on a discussion of the project of
workers' participation initiated by the Free Officers in 1961 as a part of
their strategy of mobilizing the working class by including them in the
decision-making process in the vast public sector of the economy.
The Initiative and Structure
In 1952 a military coup brought the Free Officers, including Gamal
Abdel Nasser, into power. The coup terminated the rule of King
Farouk and the British military presence in Egypt. While the Free
Officers seemed to be clear about their nationalistic plans (especially in
terms of opposition to Israel and foreign domination), they lacked
any coherent economic programme when they seized power. Only
after a decade, in July 1961, al- Milhaq or the Socialist Charter was
announced, representing the economic ideology and programme of
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the Free Officers. Following a massive populist campaign in July 1962,
the Mithaq 'received the approval of 1500 delegates from the so-
called popular forces, representing professional syndicates, labor and
trade unions, agricultural cooperatives, and a host of other groups'
(Ansari, 1986: 88). The Mithaq declared the 'Arab road to Socialism',
and reflected a major reform policy including nationalization of all
banks, insurance companies, basic and heavy industry, public works
(Ansari, 1986: 87) and later, other 'egalitarian' measures such as free
education, guaranteed jobs for university and high-school graduates,
job security, health insurance and housing. The more fundamental
reform policy, agrarian reform, was declared as early as 1952, but
modified in subsequent years and began to be implemented in 1958.
The nationalization led to the emergence of a large public sector
(accounting for some 40 percent of GDP) of which the 'public
company' was the central unit. The 1966 Law defined the latter in
terms of a group of employees who controlled public and state money
which they were to utilize for production according to the national
plan. These entities then spread over various fields of industry,
agriculture, commerce, construction, transport and communication,
business and fiscal activities (Zaalouk, 1989: 39). Although Egypt's
development strategy seemed to be inspired by the socialist models of
Eastern Europe, its brand of 'socialism' retained some fundamental
virtues of market economies, including the profit motive and relative
price flexibility (Handoussa, 1990: 202). This mixture of massive
distributive measures combined with accumulation rationale and
profit motive, and its authoritarian state form underlay Egyptian
populism in the 1960s. Needless to say, this feature of the develop-
ment model had a substantial impact on the labour movement,
industrial relations and workplace democracy in Egypt.
Prior to the Revolution of 1952, Egypt's labour movement was
relatively strong (by Middle Eastern standards) and had been
organized along pluralistic lines with diverse allegiances to the
nationalists, communists and Islamists (the Ikhwans). The labour
movement played a significant part in the nationalist movements
from the 1920s until Egypt gained its independence from Britain
(Beinin and Lockman, 1988). Once in power, Nasser's regime strived
to incorporate the union movement by suppressing the dissenting
factions and rewarding the loyal ones (Bianchi, 1989). The process
was completed between 1954 and 1964 when the Unified Labor Code
(of 1956) and the Trade Union Law (of 1964) were passed (Bianchi,
1989: 128). At the same time, the regime empowered the movement in
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many ways by expanding it sectorially and strengthening collective
bargaining. However, it restricted the activities of the movement by
banning any incitement of class antagonism, the taking of industrial
action, or trying to overthrow the political system (Bianchi, 1989:
125). Indeed a large segment of the movement was incorporated into
the regime's structure, but at the cost of handsome concessions to
both the union leaders and the rank and file of the movement.
Workers' participation was one such concession.
Initially, the Law of public sector companies stipulated that one
'blue-collar' and one 'white-collar' worker be elected to the Board of
Directors for a period of one year. However, the 1963 Law increased
the workers' representatives on the Board (containing a maximum of
nine members and meeting once a month) to four workers. The
representatives, who were to be elected for a period of two years, were
guaranteed protection by law against possible arbitrary measures by
the employers (El-Sayed, 1978: 15-16). The chairman of the Trade
Union Committee had the right to attend meetings of the board, but
not the right to vote. By 1972 some 416 undertakings including 75
companies from the private sector had a management structure of
this composition (Fahmi, 1979: 15). Several acts of legislation were
stipulated with regard to the workers' participation project, the most
recent one of 1983 aiming to 'overcome the shortcomings, conform
with the changes in economic policies and promote efficiency' (Ayad,
1988: 23 ) . In other words, with the prevalence of the open door
economic policy after the death of Nasser in 1970, the new laws aimed
to protect and encourage private investment, and to orient workers'
participation exclusively to the public sector. The general framework
of participation thus was defined at three general levels: the Project
Board level, the Production Committee level, and participation in
other forms including Personnel Committee, Grievance and Tri-
partite Committees (Ayad, 1988: 2-3). During Nasser's presidency,
workers were to be represented also in the Arab Socialist Union, the
National Assembly, and in the local and regional councils.
Ideology and Impetus
The underlying feature of workers' participation under the Nasserite
regime was that it was initiated from above by the state. But what was
the rationale behind this initiative? What was the origin of the idea?
Did it materialize out of an ideological conviction or rather by certain
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pragmatic necessities? It seems that the origin of the strategy in Egypt
was closely linked to the development strategy of the leadership.
Egypt seemed to have neither a traditional heritage (as in the
Tanzanian institution ofujumaa, or familyhood) nor an ancient idea
of participation (as in Latin American Catholic doctrine) to act as a
basis for the articulation of its modern notion of industrial demo-
cracy. The idea, therefore, had to be invented. Indeed, most observers
suggest that the Free Officers in Egypt had no clear idea about future
political and economic arrangements when they seized power. Their
populism developed only ten years after coming to power. What the
Free Officers were clear about ideologically was their nationalism.
This had been implanted by years of Egypt's colonial occupation as
well as the Zionist occupation of the Arab lands. Thus, Nasser's early
manifesto, Philosophy of the Revolution (1953), is merely a strong
nationalist appeal for Arab unity. In terms of class location, the
Free Officers' perception of world realities, like their underlying
aspirations, 'were those of the middle-class milieu from which
they had issued' (Aulas, 1988: 136). In short, it was a 'class in
which the most diverse and contradictory ideologies, whether Islamic
or Marxist in origin, are caught up and jumbled together' (Aulas,
1988: 136).
On the other hand, the Free Officers' approach to the labour
movement indicated that they were certainly not democratic social-
ists. Indeed, by dismantling the old organs of control and surveil-
lance, the coup of 1952 provided an opportunity for workers to
express their demands more freely. This new movement, albeit not as
widespread as the ones which have historically emerged during
revolutionary periods, was concerned with such issues as the removal
of old authoritarian managers, union recognition and better con-
ditions. The most significant instance in this wave of labour unrest
was the incident of Kafr al-Dawwar which occurred two months after
the coup. Following a series of bloody confrontations between the
police and the strikers, two workers' leaders were executed by the new
regime (Beinin and Lockman, 1988: 421-6). Beinin and Lockman
show that this and the ensuing incidents indicated the 'absolute
hostility' of most of the Free Officers toward the independent action of
the working class, and the communist ideology in the labour
movement (1988: 431).
The Nasserite 'socialist' strategy was manifested in the an-
nouncement in 1962 of the al-Mithaq, or the Socialist Charter, which
contained the policy of workers' participation. However, as Aulas
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has argued, the new policy came into existence, not from a concern
for equality as such but for purely pragmatic reasons: it derived from
an 'economic determinism' (choice of a development model) and
/vjf 'strategic necessity', i.e. the US and European collusion with Israel
forcing Egypt to ally itself with the Soviet Union (Aulas, 1988: 140;
see also Hillal Dessouki, 1991: 260). Egypt was then to adopt a 'non-
capitalist path of development' that the USSR would at the time
prescribe for its Third World allies. Thus, Nasser's 'third-way
development' became the 'non-capitalist road' (or rather state
capitalism) plus nationalism. As a result, class perspective was
replaced by general terms such as 'working together' and 'unity'. In
political terms, the Nasserite project was marked by 'national
democracy' in practice translated to mean state authoritarianism — a
feature strikingly similar to Peru under the military (see Cotler, 1975;
Gorman, 1982). In economic terms, it was 'no more than a Western-
type modernization' combined with the above mentioned political
superstructure (Aulas, 1988: 142).
Here lay the contradiction. On the one hand, there was a need to
mobilize the national resources by productive investment and by
relying on technocracy and managerialism with all its attendant
implications. On the other hand, there arose the need to mobilize the
popular classes in order to build a popular following, especially since
the bourgeoisie was considered incapable of mobilizing the national
resources, and thus could not constitute a social basis for the military
regime. These two tendencies, together with a strong nationalist
appeal, constituted the populist ideology of the regime. Thus, the
Arab Socialist Union, the sole legal party, technically became an
organ for workers and peasants and 50 percent of the National
Assembly was to come from these two classes (Clawson, 1981:102). It
was within this spirit that the programme of workers' participation
was initiated. In July 1961 Nasser declared:
This principle [workers'participation] is extremely meaningful. . . since the owner
of the capital who builds a plant cannot operate this plant without the workers. The
concentration of all managerial powers in his hands, in fact, represents social
injustice. Accordingly, capital and labour must participate together in manage-
ment. (El-Sayed, 1978: 16)
Workers' participation was intended to serve not only a political but
also an economic purpose. It was hoped that the participation project
would increase productivity, raise the income of the workers as a
result of general improvement with regard to enterprise performance,
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and create an identity of interests between workers and enterprise as a
whole (El-Sayed, 1978:127). In short, workers' participation in Egypt
resulted not so much from the leaders' ideological concern for
industrial democracy as from some pragmatic political and economic
imperatives. Nasserite populism was the ideological expression of
these imperatives.
Contradictions and Limitations
To what extent, one must ask, was the project of workers' part-
icipation, adopted by the populist regime in Egypt successful in
achieving its objectives in undermining militant unionism, bringing
about industrial peace, higher productivity, social peace and national
unity?
Patrick Clawson has suggested that the institution of participation,
or the 'production committees', were originally set up in order to
replace the trade unions which at times had resisted the regime's
control (Clawson, 1982: 101). It is true that during Nasser's time,
militant unionism was to a large extent curtailed, but this did not
result from the activities of workers' participation. Indeed, the trade
unions at the time had expressed reservations about any autonomous
activities of the workers' representatives on the boards of directors.
They even demanded that they be allowed to select or at least screen
the elected workers' representatives. This request, however, was
turned down by Nasser who wanted to exert greater control over
labour activities by encouraging organizational rivalries in the
workplaces. Thus, the unions and the managers were forced to share
power with workers' representatives and the local Party committees
(Bianchi, 1989: 138). In the end, militant unionism in Egypt was
undermined not so much by the institution of workers' participation,
but rather by Nasser's strong nationalist-populist appeal among the
lay working masses, as well as his distributive measures which seemed
to manifest the realization of his populist discourse.
As for the other objectives of the scheme, a study in 1974 concluded
that 'workers' participation in management in Egypt, as expressed in
Laws 114/1961 and 141/1963, [had] not attained its objectives' (El-
Sayed, 1978: 127). This was concluded by all parties involved in the
programme: the workers, management, union officials, elected rep-
resentatives and the government officials. But why did it fail?
Following a moderate annual growth rate of 3.5 percent during the
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1950s, the Egyptian economy experienced, in the second half of the
1960s, serious problems including high inflation, decline in product-
ivity and a drain of its national savings. Defence expenditures more
than doubled to 10 percent of GDP in the early 1960s because of
Egypt's involvement in the Yemen War (Handoussa, 1990: 205). Aid
from the US and OECD was suspended, and that from the USSR and
Eastern Europe was also significantly reduced. Public savings
declined and current account deficit rose (to 4.5 percent in 1966 from
1.4 percent of GNP in 1960) (Handoussa, 1990: 205). War with Israel
made the situation worse. Indeed, 'Egypt's focus on development
virtually ceased in the aftermath of June 1967 war'. Attention instead
was directed to the more immediate problems: destroyed cities and
industries, war refugees, closed Suez Canal and the lost Sinai oil fields
(Handoussa, 1990: 205).
All of these difficulties drew the government's attention to the acute
problem of productivity in the economic front. As a consequence,
according to Mark Cooper, the year of 1968 marked the beginning of
economic liberalization when the concept of'socialism' changed into
'efficiency and justice' (Cooper, 1983: 84). This meant that the
government officially abandoned the idea of democratization in the
sphere of production as the locus of change (which is to happen under
socialism), focusing instead on that of distribution. The piecemeal
transition from populism to capitalism which had already started
under Nasser from 1968, gained a qualitatively new momentum with
the coming to power of President Sadat in 1970. The advent ofinfttah,
or the Open Door Policy, almost entirely altered the populist
discourse by giving priority to foreign investment, free industrial
zones, and the private sector. The practice, subsequently, followed.
By this time, workers' participation, from the point of view of the
state, was nothing but a piece of legislation. But what were the
underlying causes of these limitations and ultimate failure?
It seems that the limitations and the eventual decline of the populist
schemes of workers' participation in Egypt were not simply patho-
logical, but structural. They resulted largely from the inherent
conflicts of Nasserite populist projects in general, aided by the
external constraints.
The first conflict related to that between the political/social basis of
the state and its economic rationale. In other words, the aspirations of
these popular classes to change the organization of production and
their interest in extensive consumption measures came into conflict
with the requirements of capitalistic development projects under
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taken by the state (i.e. discipline, productivity, reducing costs,
technocratic values, bureaucratism and authoritarianism). In short,
conflict resulted from an attempt to satisfy conflicting classes, that is,
the popular classes on the one hand, and the bureaucratic and
technocratic strata on the other. The fervent appeals by the regime to
the popular masses (especially the workers and the peasants)
provided them with a political sanction to encroach upon techno-
cratic and managerialist values and rationale. They would tend, for
instance, to oppose managerial discipline, hard work and low wages.
This, however, conflicted with the productivist aspect of the dev-
elopment path. Indeed, the technocratic resistance to this project was
manifested more in the decision of Aziz Sidqi, the Minister of
Industry under Nasser, who organized a campaign against workers'
participation (Bianchi, 1989: 136). On the other hand, the policy of
guaranteed employment of university and high-school graduates
(which was reflected in the growth of Civil Service employment by 39
percent by 1966) came into conflict both with the policy of saving and
with import-substituting industrialization strategy which had little
effects on employment.' Thus, the individual enterprises were en-
tangled by a contradiction of pursuing, on the one hand, efficiency and
profit maximization, and on the other, social objectives including job
security, selling at low fixed prices and industrial democracy.
In the difficult situation of choosing between 'egalitarian'/populist
measures and 'economic growth/productivity', the regime eventually
chose the latter. This would mean embarking upon a full-fledged
capitalist development with its private and foreign variations as well
as altering the social/political basis of the regime. The years following
the presidency of Anwar Sadat saw the realization of these changes to
which we shall return later.
The second conflict inherent in Nasserite development strategy
with regard to industrial democracy was related to the rising
expectations of the people, especially the working classes, and limited
economic and political resources to meet them. The promises of
Nasser, especially with regard to the workers' participation scheme,
created such expectations among the workforce that it was as if 'the
worker had become the true owner of the means of production, the
master of machinery, the sharer in the profit and the partner in the
management' (El-Sayed, 1978: 129-31). The objective reality, how-
ever, shattered these dreams. The power relations in industry never
changed although the regime intended officially to empower the
workers and the peasants in the decision-making processes concerning
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their work and public life; the management functions, attitudes and
behaviour remained as authoritarian as before with the workers'
representatives turning to a new bureaucratic stratum. 'This project
[worker-participation in management]', stated a worker in 1974, 'is
meaningless. The job of an elected Board member is a complete
sinecure' (El-Sayed, 1978: 37). Another worker angrily further
elaborated:
Do you think that the scarecrows we've dressed in men's clothing are going to
suddenly start moving and talking? Believe it or not, the elected Board members are
nothing more than a bunch of scarecrows. (El-Sayed, 1978: 37)
The managers' attitudes confirmed these ideas:
I was an army officer — and you know the role of the armed forces in the
Revolution, in the protection of the rights of the people, and in the maintenance of
socialist ideology in Egypt. I came here with the special mission of improving the
firm. This is what I am doing and what I shall continue to do. I will not accept the
idea that a group of illiterate workers can send a delegation to me to tell me how to
do my job And I assure you that I have told that to the government officials in the
most emphatic way possible. (El-Sayed, 1978: 65)
The third conflict was that the authoritarian nature of the state
^ came into conflict with the democratic principle of employee
participation. To begin with, the regime never consulted the social
groups who were to be directly involved in the project, such as the
< workers or the unions. In addition, the state initiated participation
without recognizing the right to debate, disagree or criticize, since in a
corporatist ideology and institution, the 'unity of purpose and
interest' does not allow for disagreement and dissent. The state
consequently encouraged bureaucratism, favouritism and author-
itarianism.
In a report from a debate conducted in 1965, 'to which several
progressive public sector directors and administrators were invited, it
appeared that workers were not adequately and sufficiently repre-
sented in the administrative board' (Zaalouk, 1989: 40). This was
attributed to the lack of adequate time for workers 'to attend political
consciousness-raising and technical administrative training sessions
— the result being that elections were carried out very much as before'
(Zaalouk, 1989: 40). However, a more recent study showed that this
shortcoming had less to do with the lack of time or 'political
consciousness-raising' and more to do with the persistence of the
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same authoritarian division of labour in the workplace. The study
was conducted between 1972 and 1974 and over 170 workers, as well
as managers, union officials, workers' delegates and government
officials were interviewed. The research stressed that the rank and file
had basically been isolated from the scheme, since they could not
place much input into the decision-making process in the enterprises,
nor see any accountability on the part of their representatives. Thus,
when asked to name any one of their representatives, over 60 percent
of the workers were unable to do so (El-Sayed, 1978: 31). Over 85
percent believed that workers' participation had not achieved any of
its objectives, and one out of three had no idea what these objectives
were in the first place. They were convinced that their representatives
had no influence on the decision-making (90 percent) or had only little
impact (10 percent) (El-Sayed, 1978: 36). They even denied their
representatives had much of a role to play at all from the start (El-
Sayed, 1978: 39).
The three contradictions and constraints cited above were not
simply accidental, but were caused by the structural limitations of
Nasserite 'socialism'. A meaningful popular participation would
require strategic support of the state which would in turn involve
political democratization at the state level and a transformation of
power relations within the civil institutions, including the place of
work. Secondly, it would require competence and consciousness on
the part of the prospective participants. Empowering strategy (such
as systematic educational and training measures, experiments,
discussion and debate), therefore, would be a necessity. However,
none of these preconditions were sufficiently met. The state failed to
transform power relations at the workplace and, for that matter, in
society at large in favour of the popular classes. In addition, the
dearth of technically qualified personnel and competent lay workers
added to the difficulties of effective employee participation (Zaalouk,
1989: 40; El-Sayed, 1978: 46-8). In the end, the workers' shattered
dreams caused a high degree of dissatisfaction, apathy and low
productivity.
As workers' participation failed to achieve its objective (of
becoming a means of industrial peace, high productivity and political
mobilization) the state employed a 'consumptive and distributive'
policy (Cooper, 1983: 93-4) to attain the original objectives. Thus,
Nasserite populism based itself upon massive incentives such a job
security, education, health and housing. This certainly contributed
to an early industrial peace, and to incorporating a significant
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section of the labour movement into the populist regime (Beinin and
Lockman, 1988:454-6). The distributive policy however, had its own
internal contradictions. It came into conflict with the productivist and
savings objectives of Nasser's economic development policy. From
1968, the state tended towards making efficiency and productivity its
prime aim at the cost of giving up distributive measures as well as
workers' participation (Cooper, 1984: 94; El-Sayed, 1978: 131). The
desire of the post-Nasser regimes to pursue this new policy, however,
did not match their political capability to do so. But President Sadat's
infitah, or Open Door Policy, certainly marked the beginning of a
gradual departure from the old thinking.
The Shift from Populism to Liberalism
At least two factors triggered President Sadat to launch, immediately
after the death of Nasser, his infitah, or Open Door Policy: the
shortcomings of Nasserite populism, and the defeat in the 1967 war
with Israel. As mentioned earlier, doubts had already been expressed
about the economic failure of Nasser's distributive policy in favour of
a productivist strategy based on a 'rational managerial system' and
free market. But it was not until after the death of Nasser that
President Sadat gained the opportunity to implement it. The infitah
was officially legislated in 1974 under the October Working Paper,
whereby private and especially foreign capital was encouraged by
providing certain incentives such as free transfer of capital and
remittances, tax holidays, free zones, favourable labour legislation,
administrative assistance and the like. In addition, large-scale land-
holding was reintroduced, and some legal measures were carried out
to return the properties sequestrated during the Nasser era.
Internationally, the regime distanced itself from the USSR in 1973
in a dramatic policy change, and a rapid rapprochement and later
close alliance with the West, in particular the USA, was made. The
change in the regime's economic strategy and its foreign policy
inevitably affected its domestic social basis and political alliances.
Instead of the popular classes, Sadat's support came from the
business communities, the class of 'new rich' which rapidly grew in
^ I the 1970s, as well as from his international allies. In short, the whole
populist rhetoric began to be replaced by a new social discourse based
upon notions of individual achievement, hard work and competition.
This was reflected in his relationship with the labour movement.
c\
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Unlike Nasser, President Sadat lacked grassroots support within
the working class. He therefore needed the support of the leadership
of the labour movement to carry out his new policies. The regime
'tried to transform the top of the Union hierarchy into a self-
recruiting elite with broad power of consultation in economic policy
making' (Bianchi, 1989: 129). Turnover in the leadership of the union
bureaucracy fell sharply and was nil in the union election of 1983
(Bianchi, 1989: 129). The national labour leaders continued to
become simultaneously government officials or agents of the ruling
(National Democratic) Party.
Yet the labour movement continued to grow; union membership
was redistributed across economic sectors and geographical regions.
In 1987, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) consisted
of 23 trade unions ranging from industry, services and agricul-
ture to military production, with well over three million members
(ETUF, undated: 15). The ETUF controlled a Labour Bank and a
Workers' University (set up in 1985), a non-degree institution
which provides training and education to the trade unionists in
various languages, technical and managerial fields. Internationally,
ETUF became an active member of OATUU and of ICATU and
ALO (the Arab Labour Organization). However, the rank and file
remained distant both from the labour leadership and the govern-
ment. The frustration of the lay working people was reflected in the
various wildcat strikes and urban riots carried out in the 1970s and
the 1980s.
The decade of the 1970s witnessed major labour protests, including
strikes at the Textile and Cable Works in Mahala in 1975, the Alexandria
and Port - Said shipyards, the Eastern Tobacco Company, and the
strikes of the bus drivers in Cairo in 1976. A major strike at the Misr
Spinning and Weaving factory in Mahala al-Kubra about overtime
pay and conditions left 50 workers dead and 2000 arrested following
the occupation of the factory and confrontations with the security
forces.2 But more significant were the January 1977 riots which
initially appeared to be started by workers in Harir factory in Hilwan
and transport workers in Alexandria, as a reaction to the reduction of
subsidies (pressed by the IMF), and which spread throughout the
country. Massive and at times violent demonstrations occurred in the
major cities involving workers, students and the urban low-income
groupings. Among the slogans was 'Nasir always said: "Take Care of
the Workers" ' (Posusney, 1990: 8). Some 79 protesters were killed
during these riots, and over 1200 arrested (Baker, 1978: 165). While
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condemning violence, the ETUF leadership, under heavy pressure
from below, supported the workers.
Following a short period of industrial peace in the late 1970s and
the early 1980s (due to a combination of repression, relative wage-
rise, and the out-migration of millions of Egyptian workers to the
Gulf states), a new upsurge of unofficial labour unrest began in 1983.
This included protests in Nasr Pipe Manufacturing Company in
Hilwan, Saqa factory in Cairo, Daqhakiya Textile Plant, Shubra
Company for Engineering Products (a war production plant), a
sewage plant in Aswan and a chemical plant in Suez. The industrial
actions involved plant occupations, sit-ins and stoppages ending
either by a management promise to meet demands or by the raid of
the security forces into the seized workplaces. Among these, the 1983
sit-in at Hilwan Light Transport Factory was particularly violent.
Demanding a nature-of-work compensation, the workers staged a
sit-in at the plant which eventually ended when the security forces,
armed with tear gas, clubs and electric prods, broke up the
occupation. In 1984, a new law, supported by ETUF leadership,
authorized doubling workers' contribution to health and insurance
pensions. This triggered a series of violent strikes and street riots in a
number of industrial areas in the country. In Kafr al-Dawwar where
the incident was combined with the rise in the price of some
subsidized items, the workers and other urban people cut telephone
lines, blocked transportation, destroyed rail cars and shouted slogans
against the government and the labour movement leadership. The
confrontation came to a halt when President Mubarak repealed the
price increase on some food stuff. This incident left three dead and
over 120 arrested. Yet sporadic stoppages continued in the following
years in a number of plants in Shubra al-Khaima, Misr-Iran Textile
Company in Suez, Abu-Kir munitions plant in Alexandria, which
culminated in the prolonged strikes of workers at Esco and Mahala
al-Kubrain 1985 and 1986.
Although in certain cases workers were supported by the local
union officials, they almost entirely acted on their own — mostly
against the wishes of the ETUF officials. Despite this divergence, both
the rank and file and the leadership of the labour movement shared a
common interest in maintaining the concessions they had won during
^he populist era.
Thus, despite the Open Door policy, the economy was still
' dominated by the vast public sector which remained virtually intact,
simply because the new regime lacked adequate legitimacy to undo
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Nasserism entirely. The labour movement, therefore, retained much
of the achievements of the Nasserite era, including rent control, job
security, subsidies, free medical care and education, working-class
housing and various other bonuses. The quality of some of these
services, such as medical care and education, however, began to \
decline.
Although it was excluded from the private sector, the workers'
participation scheme persisted in the public sector enterprises which
still accounted for some 40 percent of GDP and 50 percent of the non-
agricultural labour force. In the post-Nasser era, various acts of
legislation came into existence in order to amend the scheme. The
Egyptian Constitution of 1971 supported the participation of
workers in the management and profits of the public sector
companies. Article 26 made it clear that 'Workers shall be represented
on the boards of directors of the public sector units by at least 50% of
the number of members of these boards'. The Constitution also
guaranteed 'for the small farmers and small craftsmen 80% of the
membership on the boards of directors of the agricultural co-
operatives and industrial co-operatives' (Article 26). Since then
various acts of legislation have been introduced with regard to the
public sector companies, which indirectly affect the policy of
employee participation. A 1983 law (Law 97), for instance, author-
ized the establishment of Public Sector Bodies to participate in
developing national economy and to achieve development policy
according to general state planning. However, by the end of the
1980s, it became clear that the main debate was not about enhancing
participation, but reforming, rationalizing and even privatizing the
public sector. Law 203 in 1991 thus legally authorized some degree of
enterprise autonomy in the public sector and the implementation
of the rationalization policy. Although the employee participation
scheme was not altered, the new law indirectly limited the scope of
industrial democracy.3 In addition, the privatized enterprises
were excluded from the provisions of the workers' participation
policy.
Industrial Democracy in the Open Door Era
If, as we argued before, popular and workers' participation mani-
fested the populism of the Free Officers and served to extend the
popular social basis of the Nasserite regime, why did it continue even
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after the populist era came to an end? And, how would it fit into the
more technicist and productivist ideology and strategy of the post-
Nasser regimes, when managerial prerogative was conceived of as
solely responsible for high productivity?
There is evidence that the regimes did wish to do away with the
scheme altogether, but were simply unable to do so. A number of
factors were involved. First, 'workers' participation' was a consti-
tutional issue, and it could not easily be removed legally.4 Secondly,
there has always been a resistance on the part of the labour
movement, both by lay activists and more emphatically, the trade
union leaders, against revoking the policy. The lay activists see in the
scheme a legacy of Nasserism which is reminiscent of distributive
measures and populist/nationalist discourse — one which is regarded
as having granted the working people socio-economic gains, and a
measure of dignity and social significance. In addition, for the rank
and file, the workers' participation policy serves as a potential
organizational mechanism to counter the union bureaucrats.
In similar situations, trade unions normally are opposed to the idea
and practice of workers' participation which they consider a rival
counterpart. Numerous examples from experiences in India,
Portugal, Peru and Tanzania illustrate this conflict of interest (Bayat,
1991). Expectedly, the conflict may occur only if the institution of
workers' participation remains independent from the trade unions.
However, in Egypt, the trade union leadership wants to retain the
scheme of workers' participation. This is so because the unions have
been able to dominate the workers' participation institutions: in most
cases the workers' delegates on the board of directors are the local
union leaders. Therefore, they have a vested interest in the scheme;
and so long as the workers' participation institutions remain
incorporated in the union structure, they wish to maintain it. Below I
shall discuss what benefits the workers' participation structure brings
to the workers' representatives and union officials. On the other hand,
the government has conceded maintaining the policy in exchange for
the support it needs to get from top union officials in pursuing its
economic liberalization policies.
The third reason behind the survival of workers' participation in
the post-populist era is that it has largely been devoid of an effective
and meaningful content. In most enterprises the policy exists only
formally. My observations in Egypt in 1988-9 attested to this
conclusion. The findings resulted from interviews with a number of
workers' representatives on the board of directors in the Egyptian
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public sector companies, the officials of the Workers' University, trade
unionists and lay workers.
A meaningful workplace democracy means a genuine participation
of not merely the delegates, but also the ordinary employees in
decisions concerning the various aspects of their work and work
relations. This does not, of course, imply that all employees directly
take part in the board of directors. Rather it suggests an organiza-
tional and procedural mechanism whereby the ordinary members are
able to provide their freçly-elected representatives with input, and
simultaneously demand accountability from them. In the Egyptian
experience, the rank and file neither seem to have much idea nor care
about a scheme for workers' participation. This appears to result
from the fact that they are neither involved in nor affected by this
policy. For them, 'participation' is the privilege of an elite group of
employees. The workers' representatives on the board of directors do
not normally report the results of their discussions with management
to their members. The explanations of this vary. Some workers'
delegates do not see the need to do so, 'because', they pointed out, 'the
discussions are secret'. A worker delegate put it quite bluntly:
The board of directors has specific responsibilities. These responsibilities are both
executive as well as organizational. The rank and file should not know about these
matters. They should be allowed only to know about decisions concerning profits,
incentives and similar issues, because this is all that interests them. Moreover, they
will not be able to comprehend the strategies and plans of work.
In addition, it was commented, 'each industry has its own secrets,
just like armies', and these should not be disclosed to the public.
Finally, even if there were a desire on the part of some workers'
representatives to inform their members about the result of their
discussions on the board, formal communication with fellow workers
is lacking. In fact, any kind of assembly by the workforce in the
workplace for any purpose is 'forbidden according to law'. This
restricts one of the most fundamental requisites for the practice of
workplace democracy — free discussion and flow of information
between the rank and file and their representatives.
Consequently, most workers' representatives have come to con-
stitute an elite group within the workplaces. Representation on the
board of directors is conceived by them as a privilege bestowed by
law, ability, charisma and education. A large majority of the
representatives in my study were white-collar workers with a high
degree of status consciousness who had frequently been appointed to
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the office. The representatives stated that they normally 'do not have
any disagreements with the managers in the board of directors'.
In short, for a large group of workers, the scheme did not hold
much significance. For the representatives, it appeared to serve
mainly as a vehicle for increasing status, a place for gaining
experience and skill and, perhaps more importantly, a way to
cultivate connections. Lack of interest in a genuine workers'
participation may be revealed by looking at the educational material
available in the Workers' University. A report on this topic stated
that
The educational material contains texts which present the respective laws, giving an
explanation, or deal with tangible matters. Tor instance management system. Less
attention is given to aims of participation, respectives of participation, relations
between workers' participation and trade unions, theories of workers'
participation etc.' (Rester, 1990)
Some Exceptions?
The above discussion, however, does not intend to claim that genuine
interest in industrial democracy has totally given way to apathy and
co-optation. Indeed some evidence points to the serious interest some
workers exhibit in the idea. The sit-down strike in 1989 in the Iron and
Steel Company in Helwan, Egypt's largest factory complex, displays
the extent to which some employees take the idea of workers'
participation seriously. The strike initially began when management
refused to comply with workers' demands for higher allowances. Two
workers' representatives on the board of directors (composed of nine
members) refused to accept the board's decision, encouraging
workers to push for their demand. As a consequence, these two
representatives were sacked from the company by management. The
second sit-in which involved some 16,000 workers was entirely
focused on the issue of the reinstatement of the two workers'
representatives. Security forces thus stormed the factory where at
least one worker was killed, more than a dozen wounded and some
500-600 were arrested.5
What seems to distinguish the nature of workers' participation in
this complex from other cases, according to a worker, are that the
workers' representatives on the board attempt to retain their
autonomy from the management and the Union Committee in the
company; they do share the discussions on the board with their fellow
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workers. As no formal means of communication exists, the workers'
representatives resort to informal methods of informing their
colleagues of news and getting their input. Communication exists, for
instance, in the workshops, hall-ways or at the bus stops. The
workers, as a consequence, are keen about the fairness of elections,
and take care not to allow any election rigs, or interference from the
Ministry of Labour. In this way some kind of a tradition of militancy
has developed in this complex which seems to have contributed to
maintaining a degree of fair representation on the board.6
It follows that, in general, a major obstacle to an effective
participation in the workplace stems from a variety of state
interference with workplace or enterprise politics. The state has
constantly used its legal right of supervision to undermine the
autonomy of the syndicates (Kandil, 1991). The state may use the
same power to remove the leading candidates from the electoral lists,
ensuring that more conformist candidates get elected. It fears that
autonomous workers' delegates on the boards might undermine the
power of management. It is perhaps this fear that has led the
government to consider seriously a proposal bringing an end to the
practice of electing workers' and employees' representatives to
boards of directors.
In 1989 a heated national debate began on the fate of the public
sector companies. An interest in privatizing the public sector had
already been expressed publicly long before, in the 1970s. But the new
round of discussions occurred against a background of the mounting
strength of the private entrepreneurs, as well as the increasing
Egyptian debt problem which by 1989 was estimated to have reached
$50 billion.
The pressure for economic liberalization, therefore, came from
both the internal power block and the commitment of the Egyptian
government to the programme of stabilization advocated by the
World Bank against Egypt's debt payment rescheduling. The end
result consists of a package of privatization and/or reform of the
public sector which calls for, among other things, freedom of pricing
and allowing management a free hand in laying off and disciplining
workers (Al-Sayyid, 1990: 42). The reform also includes the removal
of the workers' participation scheme.
The top leadership of the ETUF has already declared its willing-
ness to co-operate with the public sector reform. It has, however,
expressed reservations against the privatization option. The opposi-
tion of organized labour to privatization is based upon the well-
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founded fear that, at least initially, it would weaken workers'
purchasing power, cause massive lay-offs, reduce union membership
and thus undermine their bargaining power within the Egyptian
political system (Al-Sayyid, 1990: 42).
In these national debates about reform and privatization, the
labour leaders have, in general, argued for the continuation of the
practice of 'workers' participation' within a tripartite structure. It
seems that the policy continues under the new public sector law (203/
1991 ). However, whether it will survive the liberalization policy in the
future remains to be seen. It will depend upon two factors at least: the
ability and interest of the labour movement in maintaining it, and the
degree of its effectivness and meaningfulness.
Conclusions
The Egyptian experience of industrial democracy under Nasser and
subsequent governments shows that populist ideology tends to
furnish some degree of objective ground for grassroots participation
in decision-making in the economic sphere. Yet, at the same time, it
restricts, transforms and distorts the practice of participation,
turning it into a pragmatic means of mobilizing a segment of the
society upon which the (nationalist) regime can rest. This derives
from some inherent contradictions of populist development strategy
in general, i.e. the contradiction between the increased political and
economic expectations of the popular classes, and the limited
resources available to satisfy them; between the practical implications
of populist ideology (e.g. consumption measures, political mobil-
ization, etc.) and the productivist strategy pursued (exemplified in
discipline, saving, profitability requirements, technocratic rationale,
etc.); and finally between the authoritarian nature of the populist
state and the democratic thrust of popular participation. These
contradictions tend, in the long run, to restrict and undermine the
practice of grassroots participation, including industrial democracy.
The potential institutions of participation, of popular control,
instead become corporatist organizations of the state. They in-
variably lack autonomy and initiative of their own.
It seems, therefore, that only a guarantee of organizational
autonomy and pluralism may turn the massive mobilization of the
populace in these countries into a ground for genuine grassroots
democracy and direct involvement of the people in their own affairs. I
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am, in fact, referring to popular participation within a democratic
structure, which in effect implies transcending populism. But this is
not a straightforward strategy. Serious questions remain. How far,
for instance, within the pluralistic structure, do market forces restrict
grassroots participation in the economy and the polity? In the same
vein, the Egyptian experience indicates that while liberalization of the
economy and polity potentially may remove the populist constraints
on autonomous organizations within the civil society, there is no
automatic guarantee that non-governmental mobilization will ne-
cessarily be autonomous and democratic. Indeed, paternalism and
corporatism may still continue, albeit on a different scale and form. In
addition, in free market conditions, individual enterprises may allow
industrial democracy only to a limited degree when it brings them
high productivity and industrial peace and when it is assured that
relations of control will not be altered. Beyond that, participation is
considered as an encroachment into the managerial prerogative.
Ironically while the practice of 'participation' is limited only to the
sphere of economy and more specifically to the workplace (with the
sphere of polity being monopolized by an individual, group, party or
a movement) for the authoritarian populists, the liberal concept of
participation is restricted solely to the sphere of polity and rarely
applies in economic decision-making. This confirms the long-held
argument that the liberal concept of democracy contains a major flaw,
in that the majority of the people are deprived of the means to
influence effectively the decisions concerning their working life.
Notes
The author acknowledges the American University in Cairo Press for permitting two
excerpts taken from El-Sayed's Workers' Participation in Management The Egyptian
Experience (1978). The author is grateful to Professors Heba Handoussa and Jalal
Amin, of the American University in Cairo, and Professor Mustafa Al-Sayyid, of
Cairo University, for their comments and criticisms on the earlier version of this paper.
It goes without saying that I, alone, am responsible for any misjudgement this article
may contain.
1. Personal communication with Professor Handoussa; see also Handoussa, 1991:
205.
2. On the reports of workers' protests in the 1970s and 1980s, I have relied heavily
on Posusney, 1990
3. The law, for instance, stipulates that the General Assembly of the Holding
Company has the power to sell all or part of the subordinate company (where
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employee participation operates), even if this decision reduces the public shares of the
company to less than 49 percent. In such circumstances, workers' representatives
would have no right to intervene. This interpretation is based upon a lecture on the
'New Public Sector Law' given by Mahmoud Fahmy, an Egyptian expert on the public
sector law, at the American University in Cairo, 3 February, 1992
4. I am grateful to Khalid Fahmy for bringing this point to my attention
5. Editorial, Middle East Report, 161 (1989); K. Abbas et al. (1989); also interview
with an eyewitness.
ft Interview with a local leader. The eyewitness also points to the Misr Textile
Company as a successful experience in fair representation. An important factor is said
to be the close co-operation between the Union Committee and the workers'
representatives on the Board
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